In an article published in TN Sociedad (05/22/2025) by Agustina López, entitled « France pressures Argentina to ratify an agreement that could end fishing in the 200-mile zone », they seek to have Argentina sign an Agreement that is absolutely contrary to national interests, under the inconsistent argument that this “ High Seas Treaty would allow the creation of protection zones in areas where today Chinese and Taiwanese fleets plunder the ecosystem without regulation (despite) the fact that in June 2024 , the then Foreign Minister Mondino signed a fundamental agreement at the UN to protect the Argentine sea from foreign fleets that plunder it behind the 200-mile zone ” .
We cannot fail to point out, before demonstrating that ratifying this Agreement would be highly detrimental to Argentina, that France - who is said to be putting pressure on Argentina - is among the lowest fishing producers in the world (37), while Argentina occupies position 21 and, except for Chile, none of those at the top of the world fishing ranking. [1] ratified the Agreement; only 16 low-fishing countries out of the total of 60 nations required for its entry into force have done so. Why do some environmental fundamentalists, who respond to foreign interests (e.g., the North American WCS Foundation, with islands in the Malvinas) want it to be signed? Because behind this Agreement they insist on trying to approve in Congress the erroneous and costly "Blue Hole Benthic Marine Protected Area," with the false idea that " it would put an end to fishing in the 200-mile range " (sic) as the article refers, and that, on the contrary, It would be an absolutely detrimental decision for Argentine fishing and our country's territorial interests in light of the British occupation of the Malvinas Islands; and it could also be efficiently replaced by simple measures to control bottom trawling, with a simple resolution from the Argentine authorities.
The issue at hand concerns the “Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction ( BBNJ )”.
In general, and in the aforementioned article, the same mistake is made. The aim is to dramatize the situation by referring to a " floating city ," ignoring the fact that the luminous effect of the city is due to the squid jigger fleet, which—with this selective method of catching squid, causes no damage to the continental shelf—and its extraction by foreign vessels could not be prevented unless Argentina implements bilateral agreements between states that fish in the area and, even better, between companies with state backing.
It is a mistake to say that " Argentina has no influence in that space " (sic), because since 1997 ( Law 24.815 ) the Commission on the Limits of the Argentine Continental Shelf (COPLA) who makes the presentation (No. 25) and defense of the report on 4/21/2009 before the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which approved the Recommendations on 3/28/2016 and 3/17/2017, consolidating Argentina's rights to the continental shelf beyond 200 miles; a fact finally ratified by Law 27,557.
Similarly, the article states that “ the countries that fish the most, especially squid and hake in that area, do not ask anyone's permission to do so, nor do they have quotas or limits on catch times ” (sic), an issue that would not be resolved with the creation of the Benthic Marine Protected Area (MPA) that they promote, not only because catches in waterways would not be prevented, but it equally prohibits all bottom fishing vessels from the shelf and there could be no permit for this or that vessel with bottom trawls because UNCLOS does not allow discrimination; in addition to taking into account that it is not possible to prohibit bottom fishing without a prior scientific study that demonstrates its necessity.
It should be noted that the main remote fishing States have not ratified the Agreement and, furthermore, a resolution by the Federal Fisheries Council regarding the need to obtain the corresponding Argentine registration and authorization to fish for benthic (bottom) resources would be sufficient, unless there is a scientific impediment and adequate management of the resources on the shelf.
Furthermore, it is completely naive to believe that an MPA declared by Argentina on the high seas would be accepted by the rest of the flag states that fish remotely in that area.
For the reasons stated above, from a fishing point of view, not only is it not “ essential for Argentina to ratify the High Seas Treaty ” (sic), but on the contrary, it is absolutely inconvenient and, in any case - as we said - we should promote - responsible and equitable - bilateral agreements with those who fish our migratory and/or associated resources on the high seas and/or on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles.
On the other hand, from the point of view of the negative impact that the ratification of this Agreement would have on Argentina's sovereign interests in the Southwest Atlantic and its island territories, a systematic interpretation of the 72 articles and 2 Annexes of the Agreement, by an accredited expert in international law, concludes that, among other negative consequences, "the de facto and illegal occupation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain (UKGB) over the Malvinas archipelago; South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime territories would be consolidated, taking into account Articles 5, 6, 8 and 6010 of the Agreement in question. Since the adoption of UNCLOS, far from strengthening the components of the so-called "new law of the sea" and its delicate balance of powers, achieved after several years of intense negotiations, legal engineering mechanisms were developed, consisting of the so-called "relevant legal instruments and frameworks and the competent global, regional, subregional and sectoral bodies" and the so-called "stakeholders"; forming an architecture of soft law that was designing different artifacts of legal plasticity and, the adoption of these instruments deliberately reflects the operation of a scheme designed in favor of countries with great capacity in matters of biotechnology that have the necessary infrastructure, knowledge and resources, to the detriment of developing countries rich in biodiversity.
«From an analysis of the Agreement, one could crystallize the existence of a group of States that was responsible for modifying the rules for the management of natural resources of the sea from soft law models over the years, consolidating the de facto occupation of disputed areas according to their interests» and, the Agreement «establishes the implementation of “greater cooperation” to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (Art. 2). It also establishes that there will be no possibility of formulating reservations or exceptions (Art. 70) and adds that States remain committed even in the event of denunciation of the treaty (Art. 73)».
«With regard to the operational scope based on the legal architecture, the Agreement establishes a series of institutes and mechanisms that are recognized as important faculties, while The States Parties fail to avoid the generation of special legal phenomena, such as the configuration of the "objective situation" that explicitly or implicitly entails the recognition of riparian status in areas occupied or disputed by the RUGB , although this occurs with the understanding that there will be no possibility of making sovereignty claims and disputes will not be considered, the recognition made by the States Parties in the process of formulating and evaluating proposals, as well as in environmental impact assessments, among other regulatory developments, establishes a normative link between the States involved and the coastal State. Such a link is autonomous in nature and would persist even in the event that a proposal in question were to fail or even in the hypothesis that the Agreement itself were to lose validity. Consequently, the entire system of management of resources beyond national jurisdiction will crystallize the current situation by recognizing the current status quo in fact, representing a concrete threat of significant impact on the Malvinas Question, since it would entail recognition of the coastal nature of the RUGB in the occupied and/or disputed areas in the face of any action projected by the illegal occupants of the islands, through the tools offered by the Agreement itself.
"Simply put, since the bodies of the Agreement will not interfere in sovereignty disputes, any measure that the RUGB takes in an Argentine area occupied in an overbearing manner cannot be questioned by our country and could be accepted by other Parties to the Agreement, in clear conflict with the First Transitory Provision of the Argentine National Constitution."
In addition to all this, the Agreement promotes the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs); a mechanism that, under an environmentalist argument, the RUGB has used since 2017 to protect the overseas territories under its control under the name of "Blue Belt" and, in the specific case of the Malvinas Islands, the RUGB already implemented it in the east of the archipelago through the "Joint Conservation Agreement" of 28/11/1990; to the northwest of the Malvinas with the establishment in 1994 of the British GAP of 1,400 km2 to protect the squid that migrates to the Malvinas; the RUGB's unilateral resolution of 2012 declaring an "ecological sanctuary"; the world's largest Marine Protected Area, covering 1,070,000 km2; around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. This Agreement could also give rise to the aforementioned Benthic Marine Protected Area northeast of the Malvinas, in the so-called "Blue Hole," covering approximately 148,000 km2, completing the "blue belt" around the Malvinas, facilitating the arrival of Argentine migratory fisheries to the islands, and generating new illegal fishing licenses for British islanders in the Malvinas.
With the foregoing grounds, the President of the Commission of Maritime, Port and Fishing Interests of the Chamber of Deputies of the Province of Buenos Aires and former Mayor of Mar del Plata, Gustavo Pulti, considered it inadmissible the signing of this Agreement by the National Executive Branch and urged the National Congress to, in the exercise of its constitutional powers established in Article 75, paragraph 22 of the National Constitution, proceed to discard the Agreement (File D-2193/24-25), considering that it would irreversibly and seriously violate Argentine sovereignty in relation to the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands, South Sandwich Islands, the other archipelagos and the corresponding waters, in manifest incompatibility with the First Transitory Provision of the Constitution. We support this position, also providing the arguments that we express in this article.
The sovereignty of the Nation cannot be exclusively in the hands of technicians and/or military personnel, but must be safeguarded through political, economic, military, social and environmental actions, with a deep commitment to the national interest, which take into account the supreme interest of the nation, very particularly its territorial integrity - for which our heroes gave their lives - considered a State policy in the First Transitory Provision of the National Constitution, to which all State administration actions must be subordinated.
Dr. Cesar Augusto Lerena
South Atlantic and Fisheries Expert – Former Secretary of State
President of the Agustina Lerena Foundation
President of the Center for Latin American Fisheries Studies (CESPEL)
www.cesarlerena.com.ar
May 25, 2025
215 years since the beginning of the struggle for independence and the construction of Argentina's National Identity.
[1] China, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, United States, Russia, Peru, Japan, Chile, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Norway, Philippines, Taiwan, Spain, Iceland, Netherlands, Canada, Bangladesh, Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Myanmar (Burma), Egypt, Iran, Yemen, Tunisia, New Zealand, Cuba, Portugal, Greece, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Croatia.
