On March 21st, Brazilian President Lula da Silva declared at the CELAC summit: “They took our gold, silver, diamonds, and minerals; now they want to colonize us again.” This statement perfectly reflects the current situation in Argentina. Our concern is not that foreign capital contributes to the exploitation and industrialization of our resources, but rather that Argentina’s political, business, labor, and intellectual class lacks a plan to ensure this happens while guaranteeing our political and economic sovereignty and the well-being of our people.   

On July 9, 1816, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata declared their independence from Spain, and ten days later, "from all other foreign domination." This was further solidified on September 21, 1863, in the Treaty of Recognition, Peace, and Friendship between Spain and the Argentine Confederation. The unconditional alignment of the Executive Branch with the United States and Israel unilaterally erases this popular sovereign aspiration.

Argentina then lacked the necessary resources to transform primary production into industrialized goods, and as a result, British influence increased, and it took a hundred years to achieve hard-won political sovereignty and economic independence, which we can roughly divide into three stages:

The first stage , between 1860 and 1939, saw the expansion of the railway network to 34,000 km, connecting provincial capitals with the port of Buenos Aires in response to the British agro-export axis. The ports of Rosario (1860), Madero (1889), Bahía Blanca (1890), La Plata (1890), and Mar del Plata (1913) were consolidated. The Waterworks Department (Obras Sanitarias) was created (1912), providing drinking water and sewage systems to Buenos Aires and other major cities. Large public buildings and urban works were constructed, including the city of La Plata (1882) and the seaside resort of Mar del Plata (1874). The National Meat and Grain Board was established (1933), as was the Civil Registry (1884), and a single national currency was introduced (1881). Free, secular primary schools were built under Law 1420 (1884). The State acted as a major planner, investor, and administrator.

The second stage Between 1940 and 1955, the Central Bank and bank deposits were nationalized (1946); similarly, the British and French railways were nationalized, with incentives given to local industrial suppliers; ITT was nationalized, creating State Telephones (1946), later ENTel; the SOMISA steel company was created and/or strengthened (1947); State Gas (1945/6); YPF (1940/50); Aerolíneas Argentinas (1950); the State Merchant Fleet was expanded (1946/50); the National Directorate of State Industries (DINIE, 1947); the State Aeronautical and Mechanical Industries (IAME, 1952) for the manufacture of airplanes, cars, and motorcycles. The Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI, 1946) was created; and the Import Substitution Industrialization ( ISI, 1947 ) policy was implemented. The Organic Charter of the Industrial Credit Bank was modified (1946/52) to promote industrial credits and expand the domestic market, consolidating the light metallurgical and textile industry (1947/51); the heavy steel, petrochemical and energy industry (1952/56); the Technological Institute (1940) later INIT and the National Center for Agricultural Research (1948) later INTA were created; in addition to countless works with social purposes and national reaffirmation such as the construction of Hospitals; Housing; Technical Schools; Maternal-Child Homes; Establishments for Social Tourism (Chapadmalal, etc.), the UTN, etc. which strengthened national belonging.

The third stage begins with the declarations of President Milei that "he came to destroy the State from within" (6/6/2024). 

This entire process of industrialization and nationalization was halted, leading to a loss of sovereignty that is deepening these days and taking us back to the 18th and early 19th centuries. 

Regarding the Treaties, Argentine legislation and the de facto facts of Argentine colonization , Argentina signed Treaties with asymmetrical capabilities between states, whose governments have given ample evidence of not respecting the agreements. We saw the behavior of the United Kingdom, which, despite the Treaty of "Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" of February 2, 1825, invaded the Malvina Islands on January 3, 1833; or Spain, where, despite the Treaty of "Recognition, Peace and Friendship" of September 21, 1863, recognizing Argentine independence, its Galician vessels have been fishing illegally in the Malvina Islands for more than 50 years.

On the other hand, the number and content of Argentine laws that weaken national sovereignty and production are very important. Without exhaustively detailing their negative effects, we can mention Laws 21,364 (1976); 21,495; 21,526; 21,547; 21,572 (1977); and 21,771 (1978), which reduced the control of the Central Bank, made credit more expensive, and initiated a concentrated, foreign-owned, and speculative financial system. The so-called "exchange rate table" (1978) implemented by José Martínez de Hoz resulted in exchange rate lag and the bankruptcy of exporting companies; a phenomenon exacerbated by the currency freeze imposed by Minister Sourrouille.

The "State Reform" promoted by Roberto Dromi and Rodolfo Barra, and later by Domingo Cavallo, became popularly known as " the sale of the family jewels ." Specifically, Laws 23,696 and 23,697 (1989) aimed to privatize/concession Aerolíneas Argentinas (1990/2), ENTel (1990), Obras Sanitarias (1993), Gas del Estado (1992/3), SEGBA (1992/3), Ferrocarriles (1995/5), YPF (1990/3), Seguros del Estado (1992), Correo Argentino (1997), SOMISA (1992), Tandanor (1991), etc.—all strategic companies that should have been made efficient, not transferred.

The dismantling of the State began; the decentralization and weakening of public health and education policies and the disinvestment in roads and railway networks, whose final destruction is taking place with the sanction ofLaw 27,742 (2024) of Bases and Starting Points for the total colonization and the destructuring of the National State and complementary laws of disinvestment of Public Universities; Hospitals and the defunding of essential public works.  

With the so-called Madrid Agreements (1989/90) These agreements, despite generating obligations, were not ratified by the National Congress and created obligations detrimental to Argentina that extended beyond the disputed area. This refers to British investments ( Art. 12 ) that were privileged by Law 24,184; the conditioning of Argentine foreign policy in Latin America and the EEC ( Art. 16 ); the establishment of British control over the Argentine Armed Forces ( Art. 5, 52 ); the implementation of "Economic Bilateralism" regarding fishing activity ( Art. 7 ); and the adoption of the British " Umbrella Formula ," which froze sovereignty over the Islands indefinitely. These agreements were ratified by the Foradori-Duncan (2016) and Mondino-Lammy (2024) pacts, violating the First Transitory Provision of the National Constitution.

Law 23,968 (1991) established a maritime limitation that Argentina had not ratified and repealed Law 17,094 (1966) which established the Argentine Territorial Sea of 200 miles, reducing it to 12 miles.

Law 24.093 (1992) facilitated the privatization of ports without reserving for the State the administration, defense and security in strategic ports; weakening maritime and Antarctic sovereignty.

Law 24.184 (1992) on the Protection and Promotion of British Investments in Argentina granted the United Kingdom an exceptional regime despite having invaded millions of km2 of the national territory.

Law 24.543 (1995) ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Sea where Argentina despite the lack of recognition of the ownership of migratory resources of coastal States.

Law 24.922 (1997) which, through the transfer of quotas and authorizations, removed full administration from the State and concentrated and foreignized the activity; facilitating illegal fishing on the high seas by the Chinese State and by the Spanish State in the Malvinas and its trade in the European Union.

Law 25.290 (2000) approved the “New York Agreement”; violating -if ratified- the National Constitution by giving -among other things- the status of a coastal State to the United Kingdom in the Malvinas.

Laws 26.386 (2008) and 26.659 (2011) intended to limit fishing and oil activities in the Malvina Islands, without the governments having initiated the appropriate actions against those who fish in the Malvina Islands.   

Law 26.639 (2011) on glaciers, which protected strategic water reserves, has already been approved by the current government in Congress to be modified, putting this essential element at risk.

Law 26.737 (2011) on the protection of national sovereignty over land, which prohibited foreign ownership of land and possession up to 150 km from the borders, is currently suspended.

Laws 26.875 (2013) and 27.490 (2018) which, under the pretext of establishing marine protected areas, facilitate fishing in the Malvina Islands and the granting of illegal permits.

The veto of the central articles of laws 27.418 (2017) and 27.419 (2017) that prevented the financing of Argentine shipbuilding and the growth of the merchant, river and fishing fleet and the reduction of freight rates.

Law 27.123 (2015) approved the Cooperation Agreement between Argentina and China on placing a Chinese autonomous deep space station in Neuquén, in addition to its potential capabilities.

Law 27.558 (2020) created the National Council of Malvinas without empowering or adequately integrating it to establish a State Policy for the recovery of the archipelagos and the invaded sea.

Law 27.742 (2024) of Bases and Starting Points for the total colonization and the destructuring of the National State, which enabled the government to carry out the actions to facilitate colonization.

The policy of loss of autonomy in the management of national strategic policies.

The Argentine government has not joined the BRICS, which represents an extraordinary loss of access to export markets and a weakening of its economic and territorial sovereignty. The total nominal GDP of the BRICS countries is around US$30 trillion, demonstrating the absurdity of not joining. On the contrary, the government has preferred to align itself—almost unconditionally—with the policies of the United States and Israel, even in the war with Iran. This, aside from the economic and political implications, weakens Argentina's position regarding its claim to the Malvina Islands.

The destruction of national industry. To what already occurred between 1976 and 1982 and in the 1990s, we must add the current government's policies of indiscriminately opening up to imports (not only of production inputs). This, coupled with low wages and an undervalued dollar despite rising domestic costs that reduce the profitability of exports, has led to a significant decline in retail trade and the consequent collapse of the Argentine industrial sector and job losses. Without credit and public works, Argentina is a country lacking essential infrastructure for housing, transportation, and social integration.

Most of Argentina's natural resources are exploited by foreign companies, with the aggravating factor that a large part of the contracts are approved with an extension of international jurisdiction or agreement/election of a foreign forum and, eventually, with international arbitrations.

Oil and gas extraction is largely carried out by companies with American, Arab, Chinese, British, Dutch, Italian, Swiss, Colombian, Canadian, Norwegian, and other capital, as well as Argentine companies. In the Malvina Islands area, occupied by the United Kingdom, the companies Navitas Petroleum (Israeli) and Rockhopper Exploration (UK) operate. Meanwhile , the natural gas distribution network is operated by eight companies, several of which have Spanish, Italian, and Swiss capital, while others are Argentine.

The mining of gold, silver, copper, lithium and other strategic minerals It is dominated by Australian, British, Chinese, American, Canadian, Korean, French, Swiss, etc. companies, and Argentina has abandoned uranium mining and imports uranium concentrate for its nuclear power plants.

The export of grains and oils is concentrated in the hands of a few foreign multinationals, which handle the majority of the volume through their own port terminals in Greater Rosario and other hubs. By 2025, the top 10 companies controlled approximately 90.5% of the total, with foreign companies dominating 70-80% of the business. All of these multinationals are headquartered outside Argentina and have US, Swiss, Chinese, French, Dutch, and some Argentine capital. The market is oligopolistic and concentrated in the Up River (Rosario-San Lorenzo) area, where these companies control key terminals.

Meanwhile, meat exports are concentrated in Brazilian multinationals that dominate a large part of the business, although there is a strong local Argentine presence.

Fishing in the 1970s was controlled by domestic companies. Currently, seven of the ten exporting companies are foreign-owned . Furthermore, the United Kingdom grants approximately 120 illegal licenses to Spanish-British, Spanish, Korean, and Taiwanese vessels that fish in Malvina Islands waters. On the high seas, some 450 Chinese, Spanish, Taiwanese, and Korean vessels fish for migratory resources originating from Argentina's Exclusive Economic Zone.

Regarding squid fishing, 68% of the companies belonging to the Squid Fishing Chamber are Asian-owned, especially Chinese . 18% are Spanish-owned, and only 14% are Argentine. Some 70 vessels belonging to Chinese-owned companies are engaged in squid fishing, and remarkably, most of these Chinese companies are state-owned, as are the Chinese companies that illegally fish for this migratory resource on the high seas. Furthermore, approximately 80 vessels belonging to Spanish-owned companies, authorized by Argentina, are reportedly operating hake and shrimp fishing. Some of these are associated with companies based in the Malvina Islands. It is equally untenable that while Argentina grants permits and/or allows transfers to Spanish-owned companies, vessels of this nationality are fishing illegally in the Malvina Islands. 50% of exports are from Chinese and Spanish companies. Joint research on resources with the United Kingdom transfers knowledge to the British, who use it to support fishing in the Malvina Islands. 

The electricity generation sector is dominated by a mix of domestic and foreign private companies. The largest private generators are Argentine, and companies with US, European, and Chinese capital represent a significant share, especially in thermal and renewable energy.

Argentina's water management could be privatized, and in parallel, the government is modifying the Glaciers Law, transferring the decision to exploit periglacial areas to the provinces. Water and sewage services are currently managed by the provinces through public, mixed, or concessionary companies or entities. In the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, the responsible party is AYSA; however, the Framework Law left the percentage of state ownership subject to privatization, and the Israeli state-owned company Mekorot is mentioned as one of the interested parties.

For its part, Congress approved a bill to amend Law 26.639, which would benefit mining companies, even though many foreign companies already contribute to water stress. These include Australian-British, American, Canadian, Chinese, Korean, and French companies that extract lithium, gold, and other minerals. Among those that do not directly extract resources but plan for water use is Mekorot (Israeli), which has agreements with 12 provinces. Companies with Swiss and American capital, as well as those operating through Mexican franchises, also use water to produce bottled beverages.

Argentina's lands, especially those in border regions, are becoming increasingly foreign-owned. Foreign land ownership represents 5% of the total (approximately 13 million hectares). Land Law 26.737 (2011) establishes limits of 15% per province/municipality and prohibits acquisitions in border areas within 50-150 km of international borders, strategic water bodies, or key resources. However, there are historical violations, triangulations, and pressures. In border areas, land is owned by capital from the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Chile, South Africa, China, Brazil, Uruguay, the Arab world, and other countries. Decree 70/2023 is currently being challenged in court.

The weakness of Argentina's maritime defense within the 200-mile limit is evident in the highly lax or nonexistent control of illegal cargo transport within the EEZ. Furthermore, there is a lack of effective control and deterrence in the southwestern Atlantic—especially beyond the EEZ and the Malvina Islands sector—due to a lack of strategic planning, a shortage of naval resources, operational budget limitations, legal restrictions, and a lack of political will. Naval Bases and Ports: The Argentine Naval Prefecture utilizes the Coast Guard System with satellite and radar support; however, chronic difficulties arise due to the number of vessels, their maintenance, and operational capacity. Furthermore, the ships are insufficient to cover the vast Argentine EEZ, and coverage of the southern portion of the southwestern Atlantic is virtually nonexistent. While vessels can be detected via satellite, there is no control over the goods they transport, discards on board, etc. And, the control and elimination of illegal fishing of migratory resources originating from the EEZ does not exist.

Mount Pleasant in the Malvina Islands is home to the British Naval Air and Missile Base, etc., while the government keeps Tierra del Fuego defenseless in relation to the United Kingdom's military capacity and, despite the absence of a US naval base in Ushuaia, in April 2024, President Milei announced collaboration with that country and reports refer to the logistical use of the port for US ships or aircraft, which in practice would amount to the same thing.

With the enactment of Law 24.093, ports are either privately owned or managed by public-private partnerships, and foreign capital plays a significant role in their operations. The recent national intervention in the Port of Ushuaia, despite its shortcomings, could be motivated by tensions between the United States and China.

The incapacity of the Joint Technical Commission of the Maritime Front of the Río de la Plata Treaty and the Port State Control Principles. This binational commission has done nothing to combat illegal fishing that affects the migratory resources originating in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of both countries and has allowed the Port of Montevideo to shelter and provide logistical support to hundreds of illegal merchant and fishing vessels. This is a clear example of the absurdity of approving the "Port State Control Principles"—an internationalization policy of the FAO—which Uruguay adopted in 2012 and which has not helped to improve the abysmal reputation of its ports. Nevertheless, the Argentine Senate approved it last March, relinquishing sovereignty over territorial waters and allowing vessels fishing illegally to launder their catches in these ports, where controls are weak. 

Outsourcing the administration of the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers relinquishes national sovereignty, as the majority of merchant and river transport companies are foreign-owned. River traffic of grains, minerals, containers, etc., on the Paraná-Paraguay River, the Río de la Plata, and the South Atlantic is carried out by foreign-flagged companies. Eighty percent of Argentine exports are transported via these rivers, and the main foreign river freight/merchant companies have submitted bids to carry out dredging and maintenance, which seems incompatible. Many of the 147 foreign companies operating in the area, including those with Chinese, European, and American capital, are reportedly operating under the Paraguayan flag. At the Río de la Plata's ocean outlet, maritime freight is dominated by global shipowners with foreign merchant vessels. What would Juan Manuel de Rosas and Lucio Mansilla say about this? The Portuguese had already understood in the 15th century, and later the English, Brazilians, and those from the Río de la Plata region, that the Banda Oriental and the Río de la Plata Basin were strategic due to their projection to the South Atlantic and access to the Paraná River. Where is the geopolitics of the 18th century? Let's see: from the 1980s to today, transport on the Paraguay-Paraná waterway has gone from 70% to 10% with ships flying the Argentine flag.

The national government has announced tender 1/24 to grant a 30-year concession, renewable for another 30 years, for the operation of the most important river network, the Paraguay-Paraná and the Río de la Plata. What about the coastal provinces, whose rivers fall under their jurisdiction? What about territorial integration? 

For its part, the freezing of the Magdalena Canal construction project threatens reduced transit times, lower freight costs, and regional development. Furthermore, it impedes direct connectivity between river and maritime ports without requiring passage through the Port of Montevideo, thereby hindering the restoration of the integrity and sovereignty of our waters, archipelagos, and the strategic bioceanic and Antarctic region. Water sovereignty.

The de-Malvinization of the Malvinas Question was planned through a series of political and strategic decisions implemented via treaties, agreements, and laws; the issue was rendered invisible and neglected. We have already written about de-Malvinization (cesarlerena.com.ar “The de-Malvinization of Argentina” Perfil, 3/31/2026) , but this process, carried out from 1982 onwards to resolve internal military issues, has ultimately weakened the position of strength and unity that Argentina should project in the international arena.

The lack of a strategy to carry out actions that comply with the First Transitory Provision of the National Constitution implies an unacceptable capitulation and the governments do not comply with the definitive Act of the Declaration of our Independence which states "free from all foreign domination".

The lack of integration policies with Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay and the West African States is clearly an action that undermines national interests in the South Atlantic.

The elimination of the Condor II mission; the cancellation of the Argentine space program; and the deactivation of the Argentine Modular Elements Center (CAREM). The presence of foreign radars and satellites. The elimination of the Condor II missile, which meant the dismantling of this program (1990-1993), was due to strong pressure from the United States. Argentina adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1993, committing itself not to develop missiles of a certain range and payload. This dispersed scientists and engineers; underutilized infrastructure; eliminated Argentina's capacity to develop its own ballistic missiles; and resulted in the loss of technological sovereignty and national defense capabilities.

Now the government has frozen the Argentine Modular Elements Center (CAREM), a modular reactor developed entirely by the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) in collaboration with local companies, under the flimsy argument of commercial and economic unviability. This has paralyzed construction and, once again, led to the dismissal of workers, engineers, and trained scientists. Alongside this, a severe budget cut has been implemented in science, technology, and state agencies, including the CNEA. There are also plans to partner with US companies on international programs, which would result in a loss of technological sovereignty and the export of Argentine nuclear technology.

There are several satellites, radars, and space tracking stations or surveillance sensors that involve operations by companies or entities with foreign capital. These projects are presented as collaborative, but they involve territorial concessions or limited access. Foreign control is concentrated in ground stations for satellite tracking, space surveillance radars, and remote sensing equipment. The Chinese Space Station has been admitted to Neuquén; the European Space Agency Station to Mendoza. and in Tierra del Fuego, the LeoLabs Space Radar (from the United States). The latter could be functional for the control of the United Kingdom in the southern area, according to statements by the then Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Juan Martín Paleo.

In Argentina, there are private airstrips owned by foreign capital, especially in Patagonia. These include the Bahía Dorada airstrip (Río Negro), owned by a sheikh from the United Arab Emirates, suitable for Boeing 737s and located near the sea and the Malvina Islands; the Joe Lewis airstrip (United Kingdom) at Lago Escondido (Río Negro); and private airstrips in Patagonia owned by foreign mining companies (Canadian/British).

According to the most recent official data, the central government's public debt stands at USD 460.934 billion . This figure, which has been rising since the end of 2025, leaves Argentina vulnerable to external pressures and hinders social cohesion and national development. Gross debt in dollars has increased since the end of 2023 (by approximately USD 35-40 billion). No country can be self-sufficient with Argentina's public debt.

Faced with the foreign takeover of strategic resources, capabilities, and inputs, a National Independence Plan is required; otherwise, it is impossible for Argentina to be "free from all other foreign domination."

Dr. César Augusto Lerena

South Atlantic and Fisheries Expert – Former Secretary of State

President of the Center for Latin American Fisheries Studies (CESPEL)

cesarlerena.com.ar

April 12, 2026