Naval engineer Raúl Podetti , an independent consultant and former executive of the Río Santiago Shipyard, intensifies his denunciation against what he defines as "Argentine naval military corruption".

In 2022, his novel “L'Affaire Argentine” had already revealed the “shameful” and “overpriced” purchase of four ocean patrol vessels ( ARA Bouchard (P-51), ARA Piedrabuena (P-52), ARA Storni (P-53), and ARA Contraalmirante Cordero (P-54) ) from the French state-owned shipyard DCNS Naval Group—identified by international organizations as the most corrupt in the world. This operation (initiated by Macri and continued by Fernández) was finalized for US$400 million , despite reports advising domestic construction at a much lower cost.

Three years later, Podetti accuses the current government of Javier Milei of promoting a new direct and "overpriced" purchase of four more patrol boats identical to the OPVs already acquired, which are inactive in Mar del Plata due to a lack of funds to operate them; plus a fleet of submarines, from the same French supplier, this time for US$3 billion, with alleged commissions of 11%.

Podetti argues that this "State Policy" diverts resources - the new spending is equivalent to 100 years of FONDEF - and relegates the Argentine naval industry, as proven by an investigation by the General Audit Office of the Nation (AGN) on military purchases with "treacherous irregularities".

The naval engineer has taken all his revelations to the Anti-Corruption Office, seeking to stop what he considers a "military naval fraud" that persists regardless of political affiliation.

The Argentine Affair II

This should be the title of the second part of my previous novel, based on the deal made between Argentina and France in 2018. It was in that year that four patrol boats were purchased directly from the French state-owned shipyard—the most corrupt in the world, according to the Compendium of Arms Trade Corruption ( Fletcher School ) —at double the market price. The study details French bribes of $1 billion paid in Brazil, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan, and a series of murders to cover them up.

Only Argentina purchased these ships despite rejection from all navies, including France, due to their poor performance . Perhaps that's why, since their arrival, they have almost never gone on patrol and remain a static tourist postcard of Mar del Plata, always moored at the Naval Base, while illegal fishing vessels feast near the 200-mile limit.

To explain this lack of activity, the government has stated that there is NO MONEY to operate them. However, Milei has just announced the direct, overpriced purchase of four more useless patrol boats and a submarine fleet, again from the same French state-owned shipyard, the sole and preferred supplier for Argentine naval civilian and military officials. The French government would thus receive $3 billion, minus the corresponding commissions of around 11%, according to the aforementioned naval corruption study.

It must be acknowledged that there is teamwork involved. These new fraudulent purchases were initiated by the previous government and the current one is vigorously promoting them, demonstrating that corruption within the Argentine naval military is a true State policy.

In addition to the purchase of submarines and patrol boats that don't patrol, in that same year, a fleet of French Super Etendards was also purchased, with a special characteristic: they are planes that don't fly or, at least, they haven't flown in the seven years since they arrived.

But none of this should surprise us, since Argentina has been ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world for military procurement for several years now. According to Transparency International's Global Defense Integrity Index (GDI), we are on par with Angola, Cameroon, Sudan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, China, Russia, and Venezuela. Our chances of improvement are very slim, because those who should be driving change are precisely those who benefit from maintaining the same corrupt status quo .

How is this naval fraud financed?

The $3 billion (plus interest) that the French government receives in naval contracts is equivalent to almost 100 years of the 0.8% levy on the national budget set by the National Defense Fund (Law 27565 - FONDEF) for military re-equipment. In other words, four generations of Argentinians will contribute 0.8% of our budget to provide work for the French state-owned shipyard, thus failing to meet the objective of "import substitution in defense re-equipment" defined for FONDEF. It is no coincidence that these initials are now being reinterpreted as a "Fund for the Development of France."

Stop stealing!

At the launch of my recent book CAIN, Wild Tales of National Fratricide, I made the following reflection:

If we add to the eight French patrol boats the four others purchased directly from an Israeli shipyard in 2017—also useless and at double the market price—Argentina would hold the world record for investment in patrol boats (US$1 billion in just eight years). But the most incredible thing about this ongoing billion-dollar naval fraud is that it serves no purpose, since Argentina's actual patrolling is practically nonexistent.

It's obvious that those 12 simple patrol boats could have been built for half the price at another shipyard or at one of Argentina's 16 shipyards (14 of which are private). But the Argentine shipbuilding industry was kept out of those contracts and subjected to disastrous economic policies, to the point that, during that same eight-year period, it only built ships worth $100 million. With these concrete facts, I ask our brilliant, gifted economists in charge of the government: What economic measure can increase the economic activity of a productive sector tenfold and cut public spending in half?

And the only answer that comes to mind is: Stop stealing!

Investigation and Reporting

When I gather enough evidence of corruption, my investigations culminate in administrative, judicial, and media complaints that often seem like a waste of time. But sometimes they aren't: one of my complaints to the Anti-Corruption Office ended up being referred to the Criminal Courts and is progressing, albeit slowly; and in another case, the General Audit Office (AGN) took up my complaint about fraud in the purchase of patrol cars and initiated a lengthy investigation that culminated in a damning report (#12010800). In November 2024, the AGN identified egregious irregularities characteristic of an organized corruption system within the Ministry of Security: 91% of the purchases were illegal, 74% of the contracts lacked guarantees, 69% were direct purchases without justification or an evaluation committee, and more than 33% lacked any requirements or technical specifications.

Some of the aforementioned cases resulted in the imprisonment of several foreign officials for corruption: directors of the Israeli shipyard, a president of the French state-owned shipyard, a French president and two ministers, and several admirals and officials from Brazil, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Pakistan—all clients and partners of the French state-owned shipyard. Sooner or later, Argentine civilian and military officials will also be added to this list. Justice will prevail.

Les Misérables

The famous musical is based on Victor Hugo's masterpiece of 19th-century French literature, in which he denounced the abuse of power by rulers who impoverished society. In the novel, the "miserables" were the oppressed living in misery, heroically represented by Jean Valjean, a man persecuted by the authorities for stealing a loaf of bread.

Joining Victor Hugo in his denunciation, I ask myself: Who are the "miserable ones" here and now? And I first find a painful parallel with the original French work: millions of Argentinians remain mired in poverty. This is undoubtedly exacerbated by the systemic corruption that festers at the highest levels of power and steals the resources that could help them escape this condition. However, the more current colloquial interpretation of the term "miserable" no longer refers solely to the innocent, oppressed poor person; it carries a much more negative and accusatory connotation than a merely descriptive one, being associated, for example, with the exploiter, the damned ("the wretched one") who, from a position of power, steals not a slice of bread like Jean Valjean, but millions for his own benefit.

Theft from political power is called corruption, and its highest expression worldwide (40%) occurs in the sale of weapons, which in Argentina, one of the worst countries in this matter, is currently reaching critical levels with the repeated purchases from the French state shipyard.

In the latest chapter of CAIN, Wild Tales of National Fratricide, I propose a new script for the hit musical, adapted to the national reality of the last decade. I invite you to Les Misérables, the Musical of Corruption.

Nobody Matters

These lines may outrage you, but they might also prompt you to ask yourself what can be done to end the scourge of corruption that keeps us mired in underdevelopment. This process will likely lead you to believe that corruption, especially military corruption, is far too powerful for you, making you feel powerless to solve it. And it is precisely there that the power of corruption lies, like a plant growing in the darkness of a hidden corner, feeding on our passivity.

I try to encourage more and more people to speak out, thus shedding light on that dark and murky corner of our Argentina. I try to empower Argentinians and convince ourselves that the actions of each and every one of us truly matter. That's what I try to convey in this short video:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfKIav7QZVs

(*) Raúl Podetti is a naval consultant, researcher, and director of the Colección Azul ( www.raulpodetti.com ), where his publications are freely accessible. If you found this topic interesting, you might be interested in downloading these books for free:

https://www.raulpodetti.com/l-affaire-argentine/

https://www.raulpodetti.com/cain/