Our primary and secondary school history teachers made us believe that we had definitively become independent from the Spanish Monarchy on July 9, 1816; a fact that was already foreshadowed when the General Constituent Assembly of May 11, 1813, approved the Argentine National Anthem (the Patriotic March), created by Vicente López y Planes and Blas Parera, which, with respect to the aforementioned Monarchy, dedicated the stanzas “ to the fierce oppressor of the Fatherland, the haughty Iberian lion, surrendered at the feet of a new and glorious nation, ” thus demonstrating the little sympathy that was felt for Mother Spain; a feeling, which also reached England and which would be reflected - at the proposal of the Deputy of Buenos Aires Pedro Medrano - in the modification of the Oath of the Act of Independence, in such a way that, where it said " independent of King Ferdinand VII, his successors and the metropolis " would be added "... and of all foreign domination " to avoid any other dependency that, implicitly, would be destined for the British crown, which had tried to invade us in 1806 and 1807.
Both Blas Parera and Vicente López y Planes were anti-monarchists, and the author of the lyrics, in addition to being a doctor of law and a member of parliament, fought against the British in 1807 as a Captain of the Patricians, just as Parera had done as a volunteer.
In 1813, the patriots were clear about what the Argentine government in 2025 is not: " Don't you see them hurling themselves over Mexico and Quito with tenacious fury? And how do Potosí, Cochabamba, and La Paz weep, bathed in blood ? Don't you see them over sad Caracas, mourning and weeping, spreading death? Don't you see them devouring like wild beasts every town they manage to subdue? San José, San Lorenzo, Suipacha, Ambas Piedras, Salta, and Tucumán, the colony, and the very walls of the tyrant on the eastern side are eternal signs that say: Here the Argentine arm triumphed, here the fierce oppressor of the Homeland bent his proud neck," the National Anthem then read. It is not possible to subordinate political sovereignty and the national economy to the designs of foreign interests.
In general, we observe that the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata signed the Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the British Crown in 1825, and, cunningly, a few years later—in 1833—they invaded our national territory of the Malvinas Islands. Since that date, they have done nothing but advance their invasion of our territories and appropriation of our fishing resources. For its part, Spain recognized Argentine independence on September 21, 1863, and with it the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands. However, since at least 1976, it has illegally appropriated our fishing resources in the Malvinas waters and the migratory resources originating in the Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone on the high seas. The national government, as we shall see: absent, obedient, or inept.
Going into detail, we observe the lack of national government policies or the implementation of policies that benefit foreign interests and discourage domestic investment and fishing production. In particular, they weaken control of the South Atlantic, especially its southern area, which is linked to the defense and security of Patagonia, control of navigation to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and access to Antarctica.
We have already referred to the government's project established in the "Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines", which granted total freedom to foreign vessels to fish in the Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone ( César Lerena "Alienate state assets...", 8/2/2024 ), not to unload their catches in Argentine ports, and to use vessels of any age and foreign crew members; a reform that foundered due to sectoral and political pressure that, if implemented, would not only have bankrupted the national industry but would have undermined the only effective control exercised at sea due to the permanent presence of 882 licensed vessels fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone; including the control of foreign vessels fishing illegally in the waters of the Malvinas Islands with "illegal" British permits.
Despite the deactivation of this "banana project," the government is achieving the same effect through an economic and tax policy that hinders and undermines the competitiveness and profitability of Argentine fishing production ( César Lerena "La política nacional descubre...", 18/4/25 ), making national activity unviable and deepening the concentration and foreignization of fishing; the consequences of which will not be an increase in exported dollars or their added value and an increase in the national labor force, but rather the implementation of practices that will favor evasion; illegal fishing; an increase in the dependence of national production on policies designed outside the country; and the lack of territorial and maritime control in the country.
Argentina exports 95% of its national fish production to the European Union, the United States, and Asian countries, all of which import fish, shrimp, and squid, which suffer tariffs on finished products. Spain, China, and the United States are the main buyers of Argentine fish. The United States, the third largest buyer of Argentine products, has just added a new 10% tariff to imports from Argentina. This tariff would be applied to countries that have rejected Argentina's policies. This is contrary to the position of the Argentine government, which has declared full alignment with Israel and the United States and, in addition to de facto accepting oil exploitation by Rockhopper Exploration (RUGB) and Navitas Petroleum (Israel) in the Malvinas, violates United Nations Resolution 31/49 and the First Transitory Provision of the National Constitution, strengthening the British occupation of the Malvinas and the South Atlantic.
On the other hand, in March 2024 the current government agreed with the United States Army Corps of Engineers to carry out "among other unspecified activities" maintenance tasks on the Paraná-Paraguay trunk network and the Río de la Plata, whose management it intends to grant to foreign companies for 30 years, when its administration should be in the hands of the provinces to whose jurisdiction the rivers correspond and, through which Argentina transports, among other merchandise, " 74 million tons of cargo (representing 83% of the solid and liquid bulk exported by Argentina in addition to 19 million tons of cabotage cargo), which represents a total FOB value that exceeds US$70 billion" ( Fabian Lugarini, 9/15/2020 ).
Finally , while the British islanders in the Malvinas confirm the construction of a new port in the Archipelago that will support the entire fishing, commercial, research and transport fleets in the South Atlantic, the national government is moving jointly with the United States - the main ally of the United Kingdom - to develop a Naval Base in Ushuaia that would be used as a base for nuclear submarines, in contravention of Resolution 41/11 of the United Nations which on 27/10/1986 declared the South Atlantic Ocean, between Africa and South America, as the " South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation" (ZPCAS) which, among other missions, had " the reduction and eventual elimination of the military presence in said region, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension to the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to it ." Additionally, this base would be intended to carry out logistical operations in Antarctica, a dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom and Chile. This situation will not only weaken Argentina's presence on the Antarctic continent, but also our control of the southern part of the South Atlantic and the Malvinas, and, as we have mentioned, the passages to the Pacific.
Nothing is a coincidence in the United Kingdom's policy on Argentina and the South Atlantic. In order to advance its energy policies, it has just appointed David Cairns, until now vice president of the Anglo-Norwegian company Equinor, as the new British ambassador to Argentina. Equinor is an oil company with operations in the Vaca Muerta region, and in 2019, the Macri government awarded it several offshore oil exploitation blocks in the Austral Basins (105 and 106); the Malvinas Basins (121 and 123); and the Northern Argentine Basins (100, 102, 108, and 114). The latter is 300 km from Mar del Plata. All of this, despite the incompatibilities imposed by Law 26.659 (Solanas) since one of its directors provided services to the British islanders in the Malvinas Islands and, which we are studying regarding whether the aforementioned company could be applying a double standard in Argentina regarding Norway's demands and compensations regarding the sustainability of the species in the face of noise pollution from seismic studies . On the other hand, the Argentine government's strategy is yielding: it appointed Mariana Plaza as ambassador to London, a diplomat who "proposes abandoning the Malvinas claim" ( Augusto Taglioni, La Políticaonline, 4/23/2025 ).
But, if that weren't enough, Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, along with her counterpart from the RUGB, Dan Jarvis, ratified the "Memorandum of Understanding"—signed by former President Fernández—on cooperation between the two nations to "combat organized crime and guarantee security." It's a bit like agreeing with the fox to guard the henhouse. The RUGB has occupied 1,639,900 square kilometers of Argentine maritime territory; it appropriates 250,000 tons of Argentine fishing resources annually from the waters of the Malvinas Islands; it disputes with us more than 1,400,000 square kilometers of continental shelf beyond the 200-mile boundary, in addition to Argentine Antarctica. The RUGB is an invader that keeps the Malvinas Islands militarized and vetoes our purchase of defense weapons: It is not a trustworthy country with which we can share national security strategies.
In Argentina, meanwhile, there are some 84 authorized vessels belonging to some 23 national companies with Chinese capital, many of which belong to the Chinese state. This is truly absurd, given that every year some 300 Chinese vessels illegally fish migratory resources originating in the Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone. Furthermore, who could guarantee that this illegal fishing isn't laundered through transshipment on the high seas by national companies with foreign capital, or, on the contrary, that catches are underreported?
Meanwhile, governors of the provinces of Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego are seeking to reach agreements with Chinese companies—owned by the Chinese state—that illegally fish Argentina's migratory fish on the high seas. These agreements, in any case, should be approved by the National Congress and are certainly rejected because illegal fishing not only affects the ecosystem but also the economies of the regions and the nation.
The same could happen with Spanish companies that fish in the Malvinas or on the high seas.
As long as foreign-owned national companies and foreign vessels continue to illegally fish migratory resources on the high seas, these questions will remain. In any case, the current control system is insufficient, both in terms of processing and stock control on land and in catches and landings, and this facilitates all kinds of practices compatible with illegal fishing.
Finally, as indicated by RevistaPuerto ( Karina Fernández, 5/8/2025 ) “more than thirty owners and CEOs of companies with freezer trawler vessels met in Barcelona (Spain) and resolved that the vessels will remain moored until an agreement is reached with labor authorities and unions for a 30% reduction in production costs (Note : reference values in relation to Labor Agreements )” making clear: the motivations for an adjustment to reduce negative profitability of around 15%; where the decision was made and who made it. It is striking (or not?) that a decision of this nature was made outside the country, and also the absence of the Federal Fisheries Council in this disruptive decision. Although the government would say that " it is a matter between private parties ," it should not be overlooked that fishing exploitation is granted through a "concession" of the fishing resources of the National and Provincial Governments, and the country cannot leave thousands of tons of protein in the sea. On the one hand, this business decision could be considered an employer lockout; although the main culprit is the government, because the lack of profitability is due to high tax costs, the addition of withholdings and extraction rights that it applies to the activity, and which makes it unviable.
Just days before the May Revolution, it's time for Argentines to make decisions in Argentina.
Dr. Cesar Augusto Lerena
South Atlantic and Fisheries Expert – Former Secretary of State
President of the Agustina Lerena Foundation
President of the Center for Latin American Fisheries Studies (CESPEL)
www.cesarlerena.com.ar
May 11, 2025
