All the warnings raised by the Ministry of Defense in August 2023 regarding the military capabilities of the LeoLabs radar installed in Tolhuin, which were promptly dismissed by the administration of Fuegian Governor Gustavo Melella, were ratified by the head of the U.S. Southern Command, Alvin Holsey, when he recently requested that the government of Javier Milei reactivate it in the context of the escalating war in Ukraine between NATO and Russia.

In a low voice, Melella himself hinted that the opposition to the radar's existence in Tierra del Fuego from the Ministry of Defense, then headed by Jorge Taiana, was purely and exclusively because some had been left out of the business, and not for any other reason.

However, in the second meeting held a few days ago by Admiral Alvin Holsey with the current authorities of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces ; The head of SOUTHCOM expressly requested the reactivation of the high-power radar installed in Tolhuin, which operates under the control of British capital.

It is worth recalling the key points of the 22-page report prepared and presented on August 1, 2023, by the Argentine Ministry of Defense , in collaboration with the country's scientific and military elite. It revealed the serious threat to Argentine security and sovereignty posed by the installation of the LeoLabs radar near Tolhuin, in the heart of Tierra del Fuego. Clearing up any doubt that what was billed as a simple scientific project to track "space junk" is, in reality, a sophisticated dual-use system with clear military intelligence purposes that could put the nation's strategic interests at risk.

The Keys to what the Melella administration wanted to hide and couldn't

The report left no doubt, and still leaves no doubt, as it detailed point by point the adverse implications of the station, describing an alarming geopolitical panorama.

1.    Violation of Sovereignty in a Strategic Territory: The installation of the AGSR radar by a British-funded company was considered a direct provocation, especially since its main partner, LeoLabs Ltd., is based in London. The document underscored the "persistent, illegitimate, and illegal military presence of the United Kingdom" in the Malvina Islands and the South Atlantic, making it unambiguously clear that a British company in such a strategic location as Tolhuin is completely incompatible with Argentina's National Defense Policy Directive (DPDN).

Text of the report : "The installation of the AGSR Station by LeoLabs Argentina SRL, a company formed with British capital, is totally incompatible with the military mission assigned by the President of the Nation to the Armed Forces through the DPDN."

2.    Dual Use and Covert Espionage: The report warned that, although the company claims its purpose is to monitor space debris, the radar is a dual-use system capable of tracking and following non-cooperative targets, including military satellites, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and even low-altitude aircraft. Essentially, it could be used as an intelligence tool.

Text from the report: "From a military geostrategic perspective, the radar sensors used in the AGSR have dual-use capabilities. They are primary radars capable of tracking non-cooperative targets, suitable for identifying space debris, but also appropriate for tracking third-party military satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, and even aircraft."

3.    Leak of Sensitive Data to an Intelligence Alliance: Four of the six LeoLabs stations are located in countries that are part of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom). The report raises the possibility that data obtained from Argentine soil could be shared among these intelligence services, which would represent a flagrant violation of national security.

Text of the report: " Four of the six radar stations owned by LeoLabs were located in countries belonging to the electronic signals and communications intelligence group known as 'Five Eyes', so it is inferred that the acquired data can be distributed among the intelligence services of the United States (US), Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

4.    Impossibility of Auditing and Control: The radar's technological design makes it nearly impossible for Argentine authorities to audit its operation. The system operates automatically, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and transmits digitized and likely encrypted data to operations centers outside the country. This means that Argentina cannot ascertain what purposes the radar is being used for or what information is being sent.

Text excerpt from the report: " The flow of information on these channels is constant, so it is virtually indistinguishable, depending on the volume of traffic, whether it is detection information or other information."

5.    Passive Listening Potential: The report reveals that the installed equipment can be used for signals intelligence , even when the radar is not operational. This "passive listening" capability is nearly impossible to detect, which could allow the company to obtain sensitive information without anyone noticing.

Text from the report: "The equipment installed in Tierra del Fuego AIAS has the additional potential to be used for listening and signals intelligence, even when the radar is not operating, while its passive use is very difficult to detect."

The cancellation and disarmament that no one wanted to hear

The Ministry of Defense concluded the report by requesting the cancellation and definitive suspension of the installation and operation of the LeoLabs AGSR Station. The original authorization, granted without prior consultation with the Ministry of Defense or the Foreign Ministry, is considered an act that jeopardizes the defense of national sovereignty . This is a wake-up call for all citizens, warning that the installation of this type of technology in such a strategic location as Tierra del Fuego, a vital territory for Argentina's expansion into Antarctica and the South Atlantic, represents an unacceptable vulnerability.

Sovereignty is not defended only with weapons, but also with strategic control of our territory. The presence of this radar, operated by a British-owned company with ties to the intelligence of foreign powers, raises a fundamental question: To what extent are we willing to cede control of our airspace and our security to interests foreign to the nation, even more so to companies from the same country that usurps the Malvina Islands?