When national sovereignty is given up by granting concessions to rivers, seas and ports.
At the request of Juan Manuel de Rosas, General Lucio Mansilla faced the Anglo-French fleet in the Battle of Obligado on November 20, 1845. The fleet was trying to colonize our country by establishing direct relations with Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe and Paraguay, ignoring Rosas' authority in the Foreign Relations of the Argentine Confederation. It was an offensive by an important fleet, much larger in number and modernity than the few Argentine ships. The successive battles that followed Obligado -such as Quebracho- where the invader suffered great losses, made him give up this colonizing process, so this feat was very important for national consolidation and a discouragement to those followers of the "civilizing powers." For this reason, in 1974, Law 20,770 was passed, declaring November 20th as “National Sovereignty Day,” which the announcement of the privatization of Argentina’s most important river network to be tendered distorts. Either this law, passed 50 years ago, had no sufficient reason to exist, or it is an eloquent example of the Argentine government’s lack of interest in efficiently managing the State, neglecting spaces, commerce, and national sovereignty.
The Portuguese had already understood in the 15th century, then the English, the Brazilians and the Rioplatenses that the Banda Oriental and the Cuenca del Plata were strategically fundamental due to their projection to the South Atlantic and their access to the Paraná, constituting a true "hinge" of regional development.
By the end of 1776, the need to control the Río de la Plata, navigation on the rivers, the northern and southern headwaters of the Southwestern Atlantic and the passage to the Pacific was clear, and on February 22, 1904, Antarctica was taken over . Where did this 18th century geopolitics go? Under the pretext of an inefficient State, first the entire Argentine river fleet was dismantled; then this government deepened commercial dependence on the Port of Montevideo and, now, it intends to insist on foreignizing the Paraguay-Paraná trunk network, reiterating a method that has been proven: that the State does not audit the concessions and that there is no certainty about the loads that are actually transported.
The results are there for all to see. Since the 1980s, transport on the Paraguay-Paraná River with Argentine-flagged vessels has dropped from 70% to less than 10%, and traffic is carried out with foreign-flagged vessels that benefit from the millions of dollars that Argentina spends on dredging this backbone network.
Following the issuance of Decree 699/24, which in its article 3 provided for the total dissolution of the National Entity for Control and Management of the Navigable Waterway; a decentralized body that included the provinces of Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Misiones, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires ; the national government has announced the call for tender 1/24 to grant for thirty years, with an extension of another thirty, the exploitation of the most important river network Paraguay-Paraná and the Río de la Plata, through which Argentina transports 85% of its exportable products and its imports. An act without consultation that sets aside provincial rights, granting foreign companies the administration of these rivers, also giving continuity to the dependence of transport on the port of Montevideo, in the absence of announcements of the national construction of the Magdalena Canal that, as already said, would reduce times and make freight costs cheaper, favoring regional development, in addition to establishing connectivity between river and sea ports without the obligatory passage through this neighboring port, thus recovering full sovereignty over our waters, archipelagos and the strategic bioceanic and Antarctic area. Water Sovereignty.
The Paraguay and Paraná rivers are under the jurisdiction of the Provinces of Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Misiones, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires, in addition to the Río de la Plata of the latter, and cannot be granted without the due interprovincial agreement; therefore, if the Provinces had not intervened or approved the specifications, the provincial autonomies, their economic, social and environmental interests would be affected and would imply an imposition of taxes that would require the authorization of the provincial legislatures and, in any case, reserving to the Nation, the issues related to navigation, defense and national security.
It is a natural navigation channel about 3,400 km long, which allows river transport between the ports of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay and, in Argentina alone there are 72 ports - many of them private - of which, 1 is located in Misiones; 1 in Formosa; 5 in Chaco; 33 in Santa Fe; 9 in Entre Ríos and 23 in the Province of Buenos Aires and, where some 4,000 foreign vessels in 2020 transported a cargo of 74 million tons - 83% of the solid and liquid bulk that Argentina exports - in addition to 19 million tons of cabotage; also transporting 146 thousand containers, 750 thousand vehicles and 320 thousand passengers, for a FOB value of around 70 billion dollars.
This tender limits the intervention of the main route of the Paraná River and the outer Río de La Plata up to Km. 239.1 of the Punta Indio Channel, forcing national and international Argentine trade to enter and exit through the Port of Montevideo, thus preventing direct connection with the South Atlantic and between Argentine river and sea ports, in addition to increasing costs and delaying transport, placing Argentina as if it were a landlocked country, in an unacceptable surrender of its autonomy, despite the river kilometers mentioned and the 6,816 Km (CONICET) of coasts on the South Atlantic.
In recent months, the national government has changed the rules of the game for the survival of the provinces, which until now had found support, somewhat extortionately, in the extraordinary contributions that the former made to support the administrations. In this scenario, the provincial governments should work to ensure their autonomy, so as not to be prey to the will of the central government, which does nothing more than partially return what it extracts and mismanages; although now, there is no longer any room for manoeuvre, the provinces must "wean themselves" in order to survive and those on the Paraná coast must advance to administer, among other things, the Paraguay-Paraná waterway, proceeding to develop the necessary actions to oppose this unconstitutional attempt by the national executive power to grant foreign companies the administration of the rivers under provincial jurisdiction; without taking into account regional development; the generation of wealth and issues related to the environmental care of the river environment and the police power not delegated to the Nation; In addition to increasing the cost of freight for transporting products originating in the region through the application of tolls - not agreed upon with the provinces and regional producers - and this - as has already happened - under the pretext of ensuring the profitability of the concessionaire will be permanently updated, subject to a number of unforeseen events, for example, droughts, etc. and, again, without intervention by the provinces.
The aforementioned Decree 699/2024 refers to the fact that the National Constitution in its art. 126 prohibits “ issuing laws on commerce, or internal or external navigation; or establishing provincial customs or tonnage rights”, as part of the grounds for excluding the Provinces when making decisions; but, In our opinion, free navigation and the regulatory and control aspects thereof are one thing, and other things are powers relating to the administration, execution of works and supervision of their river territory that the provinces have not delegated to the Nation, for which its intervention and approval of the decision to outsource the tasks that could be carried out on the rivers and the consequent approval of the bidding documents and the corresponding evaluations of offers and possible rejections and/or awards would be required.
The Paraná and Paraguay rivers “run through” the Argentine provinces. These rivers are an integral part of their territories and therefore the provinces do not end in them, but are part of their fluvial territorial jurisdiction. Formosa borders the Republic of Paraguay on the Paraguay River to the east, just as Misiones borders the Paraná River to the northwest. El Chaco borders the Republic of Paraguay on the Paraguay River to the east and Corrientes on the Paraná River, and this Province borders the Republic of Paraguay on the Paraná River to the north and the Province of Santa Fe to the west. This Province, in turn, borders the Province of Entre Ríos on the Paraná River to the east. In turn, this Province borders the Province of Buenos Aires on the Paraná River to the southwest, and the Province of Buenos Aires borders the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Uruguay River and the Río de la Plata to the north. What does the Nation have to do in these river areas of provincial jurisdiction other than guarantee free navigation and efficiently provide border controls with the Republic of Paraguay and Uruguay, in matters of customs and national security.
The national government could not tender anything in these river jurisdictions of the provinces and obviously could not tender customs issues and those related to national security. On the contrary, it should pay urgent and efficient attention to these issues, because the existence of smuggling and drug trafficking in transport and port areas is repeatedly reported.
On the other hand, crossing the pond and seeking integration among the people of the River Plate cannot mean dependence on any of the parties and, while it is understandable that Uruguay wants to deepen its deepwater channels to access the port of Montevideo (and this was accepted by the CARP authorities in 2018) to promote its trade; it is absolutely incomprehensible that Argentina has not improved its waterways to reduce its transport times; the costs of services while waiting for ships; the reduction of maintenance and dredging costs of the channels, etc. and, fundamentally, the integration of its national waterways with the maritime ones of the Southwestern Atlantic, with the consequent regional and town development, whose production and trade can be increased through the use of Argentine rivers and sea. These are the issues that would be achieved with the construction of the “Magdalena Canal” (Southern Route) of about 55.6 km that would run in double track parallel to the Buenos Aires riverbank and whose project was drawn up more than twenty years ago, through which, with the proposed route, about 42.7 km of travel would be reduced; about two hours of navigation, without taking into account the current hours and days of waiting; with an investment that - according to experts - could be recovered in about ten years. and whose studies would be completed, certified, accredited and approved by the Río de la Plata Administrative Commission.
State structures must be made efficient, that is what running a government is all about. The solution is not to close, grant concessions or privatize, but to reorganize and put a country that is on standby back on track, and with it, national sovereignty. And this is not proclaimed, it is exercised.
Dr. Cesar Augusto Lerena
Expert in South Atlantic and Fisheries.
Former Secretary of State.
President of the Center for Latin American Fisheries Studies (CESPEL)
Web: cesarlerena.com.ar
November 29, 2024
