Following Brexit, the United Kingdom is redefining its global projection. It is articulating a geopolitics that draws on its past glories, but now adapted to the new historical circumstances. In this sense, “Global Britain” is its new roadmap, fueling the British manifest destiny. Through Global Britain, it is structuring trade, defense, technology, and alliances, supported by a network of territories and strategic infrastructure where our Malvina Islands remain vital to British planned policy.

CONICET researcher Sonia Winer analyzes the different stages of British expansionist policy and, in this account, confirms that “Global Britain” does not signify a retreat but rather an operational reorganization in response to new elements of biopower. Within the global network of British nodes, the interests of colonial strongholds that Great Britain is unwilling to negotiate are understood: Gibraltar to control access to the Mediterranean; Cyprus (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) as a projection in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean; Diego Garcia as a strategic base in the central Indian Ocean; Ascension Island as an interoceanic logistics hub; and, finally, our disputed territories. The presence in the Malvina Islands responds not only to the exploitation of our natural resources and the strategic projection towards Antarctica but also to its presence and surveillance in the South Atlantic (its location remains key for transatlantic trade); the South Sandwich Islands as an extension of sovereignty and resources; and Antarctica as an outpost for scientific and climatological research and an enclave for sovereign claims on the white continent.

“Global Britain” is the foreign and trade policy agenda formulated by the UK government to redefine its identity, influence, and international alliances following Brexit. Among its objectives is the reinforcement of soft power over our regions, whose national identity was abandoned by progressive discourse and is now being dismantled by foreign-influenced libertarianism. In this sense, it is no coincidence that it indisputably leads the Artificial Intelligence ecosystem in Europe. The British strategy is implemented through the AI Opportunities Action Plan, which mobilizes billions of pounds in public and private funds structured around key areas such as the AI Hardware Plan and sovereign infrastructure .

The UK's massive investment in supercomputing and sovereign Artificial Intelligence (AI) infrastructure (an additional £750 million, including systems like Isambard-AI and Zenith ) impacts the politics of influence in the social sciences of Latin America . The main reason for this is the rise of "Data Imperialism" and methodological dependence: by centralizing Europe's greatest computing power in British universities, our social sciences face a structural asymmetry, exacerbated by the "soft power" that has been conditioning and imposing an accelerated regional research agenda in our country since the return to democracy in 1983. That victory of radicalism sacrificed the "national and popular epic": through social-democratic rhetoric, any discourse or social actor that was not liberal-democratic was identified as authoritarian and, as such, a potential destabilizing force. Based on this, the methodological renewal in the field of social sciences conceived as ethical a false plurality that implicitly deployed a “demilitarized”, “de-Malvinizing” and therefore “anti-national” view, conceiving the Nation as an “imagined” and “authoritarian” construction.

The Anglocentric bias evident in algorithms based on the English language and Western contexts of the Northern Hemisphere, along with the conditioning of the regional research agenda, are powerful “colonizers” of a stateless common sense. Through public funding agencies such as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the United Kingdom directs funds toward global projects that utilize this infrastructure. To access joint research grants and computing time on servers like Isambard-AI, social scientists in Latin America must align their hypotheses with the ethical standards, governance frameworks, and foreign policy priorities dictated by London.

These funding programs follow the same logic as the missions deployed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations during the last century, but now require new dynamics dependent on global connectivity and academic dependence/legitimacy stemming from new technologies. British agencies (such as the FCDO or the British Academy) logically exclude from their grants projects that could validate or strengthen Argentina's sovereign claim over our Malvinas Islands, as this directly clashes with their geopolitical interests and the guidelines of the "Global Britain" agenda.

However, there are indeed renowned Argentine social scientists who have used UK funding or platforms. Within this spectrum, we could refer to two paradigmatic issues: the Antarctic cooperation channel, on the one hand, and the academic historiographical channel on the Malvinas War, on the other. Regarding the former, historians and sociologists of science from the Argentine Antarctic Institute have participated in joint projects under the Memorandum of Understanding for Scientific Cooperation in Antarctica signed between Argentina and the United Kingdom (2018). The dynamics of this funding established a “silent condition” related to Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Argentine scientists can conduct research and interact with British counterparts as long as the object of study is framed within dialogue, peace, and global scientific cooperation, omitting the overlapping sovereignty claims between the Argentine Antarctic Sector and the British Antarctic Territory. The second approach, while more targeted, reflects the policy of de-Malvinization: prominent researchers of recent history, such as Germán Soprano and Federico Lorenz, have participated in seminars, conferences, and publications funded or edited by British institutions (such as the University of Manchester or the London School of Economics). When an Argentine social scientist accesses these spaces or uses British-funded archives, the required conceptual framework is usually that of “Comparative Historiography of War.” This means that they can delve into the combat experiences of soldiers on both sides, although the presentations and papers must be adapted to Anglo-Saxon academic terminology, addressing the 1982 conflict as a historical war event delimited in time and not as an ongoing colonial dispute. The political, economic, and social consequences of the postwar period are not even considered. A separate case is that of María Inés Tato, who, while managing to circumvent the traditional geopolitical blockade imposed by the British agenda, secured transnational funding by structuring her study under the umbrella of “a two-sided war.” This funding came from global academic publishers and cross-university grants. Her academic argument avoids the current diplomatic debate on sovereignty. Instead, the focus shifts to the human experience of combatants from both armies and the cultures of war of the time.

These structures, often defined as instruments deployed as soft power, have been deepened in recent years, as part of the "Global Britain" agenda. British policy responds to greater preparedness, innovation, industry, alliances, and capabilities across all domains, shifting from the thalassocracy characteristic of its hegemonic splendor in the 19th century to a datacracy: power no longer emanates from those who possess fleets and maritime control, but from those who own servers and monopolize data infrastructure. Algorithms and mathematical models become the new invisible regulators of truth, reinforced by a policy of pedagogical colonization sustained since the abandonment of a sovereign identity.