Resolution 230/2023 (8/31/23) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relating to the NATIONAL MARITIME STRATEGY, will undoubtedly be a cause for debate in the academic fields of Defense and will cast doubts on the training in the Institute of Defense itself. Foreign Service of the Nation. The basic nature of this instrument is notable, its limited scope and the lack of protection for the marine spaces, the continental shelf and the Argentine archipelagos invaded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain (RUGB) or disputed by this power. .
Let us begin by saying that this Resolution that determines the “ National Maritime Strategy ” cannot be limited to the “purpose of coordinating the activities of the organizations responsible for the Argentine maritime administration, which exercise functions in the maritime and port field” (sic) and that, through this, " the guidelines to be followed during the next five-year period (2022-2026) ( NdA: two years after the five-year plan began ) are established , with the objective of guaranteeing that the Argentine State complies with its obligations and responsibilities derived from the mandatory instruments of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)..." (sic) , an issue that is inherent to the PENa through Law 22,520 and to the mission and functions of each of the secretariats and, much less is it possible, that the Nation adjusts to fulfilling obligations of a “Port State”, which Argentina did not ratify. The IMO says in this regard: “ The different States will consider this code in accordance with their own circumstances and should only be obliged with respect to the implementation of the instruments in which they are Contracting Governments or Party” ˂A.1070 (28) Code III˃ , an obligation that is absolutely contrary to national interests, to the care of its maritime and insular sovereignty and to the autonomous exploitation of ports and sustainability of resources.
A simple instrument for coordinating obligations cannot be pompously called “NATIONAL MARITIME STRATEGY” ; Furthermore, the strategy to guarantee Argentine sovereignty in maritime jurisdiction has not previously been defined; very particularly in the matter of safety and protection of the marine environment referred to in Res.A.1070 (28) of the IMO Code III, when the British illegally extract 250,000 annual tons of resources through the granting of equally illegal licenses. fishing vessels in the Malvinas and some 500 Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese and Spanish vessels extract another 700 thousand tons of migratory resources originating from the EEZ on the high seas. In both cases, producing a regrettable imbalance in the marine ecosystem, which is usually accompanied by slave labor, Job insecurity at sea and drug trafficking, as has been repeatedly denounced. Likewise, Res.A.1067 (28) of Code III is only intended to “ describe the objective, principles, scope, responsibilities and capacity-building aspects of the audit of an IMO Member State ”.
The IMO is a United Nations agency, based in London, whose function is to promote cooperation between States and maritime transport companies , to contribute to improving maritime safety and avoiding marine pollution, through Conventions. International among which the “Safety of human life at sea ” (SOLAS, 1974, amended) stands out; “ Prevention of pollution from ships ”, 1973, modified in 1978 and 1997 (MARPOL); “ The training of seafarers ”, 1978, mod.1995/2010; “Maritime search and rescue ”, 1979 (SAR); “ The repression of illegal acts against the safety of maritime navigation ”, 1988/2005 (SUA); “ The prevention of collisions ”, 1972 and several more.
Urged, because the IMO, it says, would carry out an audit of our country between September 30 and October 9 of this year, the Foreign Ministry dictates Res.230 on August 31; thirty days after the hypothetical audits and, he states, that “the Argentine Naval Prefecture has agreed; the Argentine Navy; the Naval Hydrography Service; the National Weather Service; the Transportation Safety Board; the Undersecretariat of Ports of the Ministry of Transportation; having obtained the formal adhesion of the competent organizations” without specifying which ones and of “ the areas with relevant competence of this Foreign Ministry ”, taking intervention, among them, “the Coordination of Ocean Policy of the South Atlantic of the Secretariat of Malvinas, Antarctica and Atlantic South; the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, the Directorate of Human Security, Innovation and International Technological Affairs and the Directorate of International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Directorate of Legal Affairs.Although, the absence of approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces (its Joint Antarctic Command and Operational Command) is very striking; the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries and the Ministries of Environmental Development; Defense and Security of the Nation, who had to take action on the inherent maritime security and protection of the marine environment that the IMO deals with, beyond their subsequent intervention - which is indicated - in the executive task and resource formation.
The opinion of the “National Council of Affairs relating to the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands, South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and island spaces” was also omitted, created by Law 27,558 and made up of the president of the Nation, senators and deputies of the legislative power, the governor of Tierra del Fuego, academics of international law and representatives of the former Malvinas Combatants who, among other functions, are designing State policies and collaborating on issues of sovereignty, therefore, their opinion when This respect is insurmountable. It does not catch our attention, in three years this Council did not prepare a single relevant proposal.
With all due respect, Annex I, which is signed by the general director of the Legal Department of the Chancellery, writes only statements; The scope of what he calls Strategy “is limited to the formulation of the necessary guidelines” ( sic ) and does not even manage to be a “Manual of Mission and Functions and of coordination and execution of Procedures” and, of course, it cannot be called “ National Maritime Strategy”, because it does not even make any reference to Argentine jurisdiction, to the DTP of the National Constitution; to Art.2nd of Law 24,543 of ratification of the Convention of the Sea (UNCLOS); to the art.
